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Abstract. The lawsuit brought by Viacom and other copyright owners against YouTube 
underscores the uncertainties of the law of secondary liability for third-party copyright 
infringement. Particularly, it shows the strengths and weaknesses of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, on which most Web 2.0 service providers heavily rely for protection from liability 
for their users’ infringements. This article explores the relationships between the protection 
granted by the DMCA safe harbors and the standards of secondary liability developed at common 
law, with special reference to that of inducement adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
Grokster case. Keywords: YouTube, Secondary Liability, DMCA, inducement, copyright. 
1. Introduction. 
 
Liability of online service providers in the field of copyright continues to be a highly controversial issue. This is 
particularly true of the liability of providers operating platforms generally referred to as web 2.0 where users 
upload vast amounts of potentially copyrighted creative content, including photographs, music or video files. 
Services such as YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, eBay, Amazon, or Flickr, among many others, are examples of 
this category of platforms. Under the US law, all these providers rely on the protection established by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), a 1998 statute that creates a series of liability safe harbors for specific 
online activities.1 One of the activities covered is the storage of materials provided by users, so that qualifying 
service providers are exempted from liability for all monetary relief for direct and secondary liability by reason 
of the storage of infringing content at the direction of their users.2 
 
The application of this safe harbor has been discussed in just a handful of cases, the most relevant of which is 
probably the Viacom’s suit against YouTube, recently decided at the lower court level.3 On 23 June, 2010, after 
more than three years of litigation and a voluminous record—but only some days after the parties filed their last 
briefs concerning their cross motions for summary judgment—the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York handed down its much-expected ruling on this case. The parties and their supporting amici 
had advanced and discussed all types of possible arguments in favour and against YouTube’s liability for the 
infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.4 Chief among the disputed legal issues was whether defendants 
were shielded from copyright liability under the DMCA’s hosting safe harbor. The court granted summary 
judgment that defendants were indeed entitled to the DMCA protection against all of plaintiffs’ direct and  
 
                                                          
∗
  This paper was originally published in Kierkegaard, S. (2010) Private Law: Rights, Duties and Conflicts. IAITL. pp.423-
435 
1
 Title II of the DMCA amended Chapter 5 of Title 17 of the United States Code, by adding a new section 512 titled 
“Limitations on liability relating to material online”. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
2
 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000) (“Information Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction of Users”). 
3
 Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 2010 WL 2532404 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010). The ruling grants defendants motion for 
summary judgment and denies the cross motions filed by both Viacom and the Class Plaintiffs (The Football Association 
Premier League Limited, et al.). In this article, unless indicated otherwise, I will use the term “YouTube” to refer generally to 
defendants (YouTube, Inc., YouTube, LLC, and Google Inc.). 
4
 Almost all documents filed with the case are available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/new-
york/nysdce/1:2007cv02103/302164  / (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). 
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secondary copyright infringement claims. Viacom immediately announced it would appeal the ruling and thus 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit will have the opportunity to decide on the matter.5  
 
Viacom v. YouTube offers a good opportunity to reflect on the meaning and operation of the hosting safe 
harbor and its ability to supply legal certainty for user-generated content platforms and other Web 2.0 service 
providers. While the DMCA intended to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of service providers 
and copyright owners, the parties in the lawsuit appear to hold strongly different views as to how some of the 
key points of the statute must be construed. Both parties insist that the law is perfectly settled—albeit in exactly 
opposite ways. Disagreements encompass a wide range of issues, including the very meaning of the balance the 
DMCA intended to strike. Service providers and copyright owners argue about basic policy options supposedly 
addressed by the law, such as who should bear—and to what extent—the burden of searching for copyright 
infringement. Likewise, they dispute whether the DMCA safe harbors shelter a service provider in case of 
inducement—a theory of secondary liability developed by the US Supreme Court in the Grokster case.6  
 
Both sides disagree as well on the interpretation of specific elements of the safe harbor provisions. They 
disagree for instance on the scope of the hosting safe harbour - i.e. which activities may be deemed to occur “by 
reason of the storage at the direction of a user”. They have also different views on the meaning of the so-called 
‘red flag’ provision—i.e. what amounts to awareness “of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent” and which are the duties this awareness triggers. Another point of disagreement is whether the DMCA 
merely codifies the common law standards for vicarious liability or if the notions of “financial benefit directly” 
and “right and ability to control such activity” have a different meaning within the statute.  
 
While these and other relevant points of the DMCA are under dispute between the parties, the debate is not 
limited to the interpretation that statute; rather, the parties have conflicting positions on almost every legal theory 
imposing liability for copyright infringement. As to direct liability, for instance, they disagree on what 
constitutes the volition element to find infringement. Regarding contributory liability, they diverge on what 
amounts to inducement under Grokster. With respect to vicarious liability they differ on how the common law 
standards must be assessed. 
 
These conflicting legal arguments reflect different understandings of how copyright should be enforced in 
the web 2.0 environment. To be sure, from a more general viewpoint, the dispute involves the long debated 
question of how to treat technologies capable of both infringing and non infringing uses. To what extent should 
disruptive technologies be allowed to go ahead when they may result in a general increase of copyright 
infringement? Should a given new technology or device be obliged to limit itself so that it cannot be used for 
infringement purposes, even at the cost of cutting off many of its legitimate uses? Should copyright owners be 
forced to bear the burden of investing more and more resources to police and prevent the widespread 
infringement made possible by a given new development? Conversely, if this burden were to be imposed on the 
operators of the innovative platforms or services, wouldn’t this imply an unjustified obstacle to progress and 
innovation? Imagine for example a promising new technology that is supposed to be widely used for legitimate 
and even socially desirable purposes in a foreseeable future, but that in its first stages of development is used 
mainly for copyright infringement by end users. Suppose further that in order for this technology to achieve the 
necessary level of development it must reach a sufficient number of users and that they are likely to arrive 
attracted precisely by the infringing possibilities the new technology facilitates. Should copyright owners be 
allowed to stop the development of the new technology or to get somehow compensated by its developers on 
account of the increased level of infringement? Would the answer to this question depend on whether or not the 
provider of the new technology or service is actually fostering the infringing uses or using the infringing 
possibilities as a draw to attract users? Would liability ultimately turn on the actual or constructive knowledge 
the operator may have of specific instances of infringement? And if so, could the operator avoid liability by 
engaging in some form of wilful blindness? 
                                                          
5
 See Viacom’s Notice of Appeal, Viacom 2010 WL 2532404 (No. 402), filed on August 11, 2010. 
6
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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These and similar questions lie behind conflicts that arise at the intersection of copyright and innovative 
technologies or services. Disputes of this nature have been addressed by courts on different occasions. Two well 
known cases decided by the US Supreme Court are prominent examples of this. The first one is Sony v. 
Universal, also known as the ‘Betamax’ case.7 At issue in this case was Sony’s liability for the copyright 
infringements made possible by its videocassette recorder. The second example is the Grokster case, mentioned 
above, which dealt with the liability of a distributor of peer-to-peer software for the infringements it facilitated. 
Both rulings adopted legal standards intended to achieve an appropriate balance between the interests at stake. In 
Sony, the US Supreme Court, reflecting the patent law’s traditional staple article of commerce doctrine, ruled 
that one who distributes a device that enables copyright infringement, with constructive knowledge that some 
will actually engage in infringing activities, is not liable for the infringements performed by end users if the 
device is “capable of substantial non infringing uses”.8 In Grokster, defendants relied on the Sony rule to escape 
liability, as the peer-to-peer software is indeed capable of substantial non infringing uses. The Supreme Court 
noted, however, that Sony “was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common 
law” and that “where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to 
infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule 
will not preclude liability”.9 The Grokster court further stated that the patent’s law rule on inducement of 
infringement was also appropriate in the field of copyright. It adopted accordingly that rule, holding that “one 
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression 
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.”10 
 
Not only courts but also Congress has tried to craft a balanced legal framework. As noted, this was the 
purpose behind the DMCA safe harbors scheme, which, according to the legislative history, “preserves strong 
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright 
infringements that take place in the digital networked environment”, and “[a]t the same time, it provides greater 
certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of 
their activities.”11 The balance, however, is difficult to achieve in a rapidly changing environment. The dispute in 
Viacom v. YouTube, a lawsuit filed almost a decade after the DMCA was enacted, underscore those difficulties. 
In this Article I do not intend to cover all the issues raised by this case; instead I will focus on the relationship 
between the safe harbors and the doctrines of secondary liability, particularly that of inducement, as well as on 
some internal inconsistencies of the statute that may dilute its intended balance. 
2. The DMCA safe harbors and the doctrines of secondary liability 
Liability of online service providers, and more generally that of operators of technologies that enable copyright 
infringement by third parties, rests mainly on doctrines of secondary liability. This was the case in both Sony and 
Grokster, and it is also the case in Viacom v. YouTube. In fact, while Viacom claims that YouTube is also 
directly liable, the lawsuit is primordially about secondary liability. 
 
As opposed to ‘direct’ liability, that is, liability imposed on those who directly engage in acts of 
infringement, the idea of secondary, or derivative, liability relates to those instances were one is held liable for 
infringements committed by another. This liability is not expressly imposed by the Copyright Act; rather, it has 
been developed by courts. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 446 U.S. 417 (1984). 
8
 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
9
 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-35. 
10
 Id. at 936-37. 
11
 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, Part 2, at 49-50 (1998). 
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Secondary liability may be established under two different doctrines, namely, contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability. The classic statement regarding contributory infringement affirms that «[o]ne who, with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory infringer’».12 With regard to vicarious liability, the traditional 
formula states that «[w]hen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial 
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright 
monopoly is being impaired—the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of 
liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.».13 Both theories of derivative liability have been expressly 
recognized by the Supreme Court.14 However, the ways courts have been applying them have not always been 
perfectly homogeneous.15 
 
In its lawsuit against YouTube, Viacom claims that defendants are liable under both doctrines of secondary 
liability. First, it claims defendants are liable under the inducement rule adopted in Grokster, which is actually a 
form of contributory liability,16 because they “intentionally operated YouTube as a haven for massive 
infringement.”17 Second, it claims defendants are vicariously liable because they “derived a direct financial 
benefit from infringement that they had the right and ability to control.”18 YouTube rejects both claims and, 
more importantly, it contends that the court does not even need to consider whether those allegations have merit, 
because YouTube is entitled to the DMCA hosting safe harbor, which protects it against all liability claims. In 
other words, even if YouTube could be considered liable under the common law’s doctrines of secondary 
liability—which it denies—it would be nonetheless exempted from that liability by virtue of the hosting safe 
harbor provision.19 Viacom holds a different view of the safe harbors, asserting that they do not immunize 
defendants from common law secondary liability claims. In particular, Viacom emphasizes that the DMCA does 
not protect defendants against liability for inducement,20 and that it does not protect them either against vicarious 
liability. 21 
                                                          
12
 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
13
 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. HL Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). 
14
 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (“The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition 
of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For 
vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species 
of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions 
of another.”) (Footnote omitted). See also Grokster 545 U.S. at 930 (“[T]hese doctrines of secondary liability emerged from 
common law principles and are well established in the law”). 
15
 See Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184 (2006) (discussing the different 
constructions of third party liability followed by courts before Grokster). 
16
 See Grokster 545 U.S. at 930 (“One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct 
infringement.”). See also Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines: The Questionable Role of Criminal Law 
In Contributory Infringement Doctrine, 2009 BYU L. REV. 783, 787. See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 
F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) (“one contributorily infringes when he (1) has knowledge of another's infringement and (2) 
either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement.”). 
17
 See Memorandum of Law In Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability and Inapplicability 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbor Defense at 5, Viacom 2010 WL 2532404 (No. 186) [hereinafter, 
Viacom’s memorandum]. 
18
 Id. at 30. 
19
 See Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 79, Viacom 2010 WL 2532404 
(No. 188) [hereinafter, YouTube’s memorandum] (“As an initial matter, a finding that YouTube is protected by the Section 
512(c) safe harbor would preclude damages liability for any of plaintiffs’ infringement theories—including inducement.”). 
20
 See Viacom’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 23 Viacom 2010 WL 
2532404 (No. 284) [hereinafter, Viacom’s Opposition] (“Defendants (backed by their amici, who also defended Grokster in 
the Supreme Court) embrace the extremist position that even if they are liable as intentional infringers under Grokster, the 
DMCA would still immunize that intentional wrongful conduct. But the law (not to mention common sense and sound 
policy) does not permit Defendants to indirectly circumvent Grokster and reap the benefits of their intentional wrongdoing on 
the basis of an extreme and one-sided reading of the DMCA.”) (internal citations omitted). 
21
 See Viacom’s memorandum, at 57 (“Defendants are liable for the infringement on YouTube under the common law of 
vicarious copyright liability. Therefore, under § 512(c)(1)(B) incorporating that standard, Defendants cannot use the DMCA 
to escape liability.”). 
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The contention that a defendant who would be liable under common law’s criteria of derivative liability—
including inducement—is not protected by the DMCA safe harbors can be argued in two different ways. First, by  
pointing out that the conditions required by the DMCA in order to benefit from the safe harbors basically track 
the common law standards of secondary liability, and thus, being secondarily liable under the common law 
criteria would normally result in failing to meet the DMCA statutory requirements.22 Second, by referring to the 
purpose of the statute, that is, reasoning that the safe harbors were never meant to apply to an intentional 
wrongdoer, and that, as a consequence, where a defendant meets the standard on inducement, section 512 would 
not even come into play. I will briefly consider these approaches in the following subparts. 
2.1 The position that the DMCA merely codifies the common law criteria on secondary liability 
Section 512(c) exempts a service provider from liability for all monetary relief (and, in a limited way, also from 
injunction relief) “for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” This limitation of liability 
is subjected to several conditions, some of which appear to parallel the common law standards for contributory 
and vicarious liability. First, with regard to contributory infringement, the statute tracks the traditional common 
law standard that holds liable a defendant who has actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing activity 
and, nonetheless, continues to materially contribute to the infringement. In this respect, Section 512(c)(1)(A) 
requires that the service provider “(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” Section 512(c)(1)(C) further 
demands that “upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), [the service provider] 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the 
subject of infringing activity.” Second, as for the common law standard of vicarious liability, Section 
512(c)(1)(B) requires that the service provider “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.” 
 
Does this mean that the hosting safe harbor simple does not protect a defendant that would be secondarily 
liable at common law, and thus limits its effect to immunize a defendant from direct liability? This would be the 
logic conclusion if those requirements were completely coincident with the common law standards. However, it 
can be shown that there are at least some differences between both sets of criteria.23 Moreover, Section 512’s 
legislative history shows that the statute did intend to cover at least some instances where, in the absence of the 
safe harbors, secondary liability would arise.  
 
In this respect, the Conference Report states that “[a]s provided in subsection (l), Section 512 is not intended 
to imply that a service provider is or is not liable as an infringer either for conduct that qualifies for a limitation 
of liability or for conduct that fails to so qualify. Rather, the limitations of liability apply if the provider is found 
to be liable under existing principles of law.”24 Now, this limitation of liability is by no means reserved to 
providers that would be found directly liable. Rather, it also protects those who would be held secondary liable at  
                                                          
22
 Albeit acknowledging that some differences exist, this approach has been basically followed, for instance, in Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578, 2009 WL 6355911, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (“In many ways, the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act is simply a restatement of the legal standards establishing secondary copyright 
infringement—in many cases, if a defendant is liable for secondary infringement, the defendant is not entitled to Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act immunity; if a defendant is not liable for secondary infringement, the defendant is entitled to 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act immunity. The two sets of rules do not entirely overlap, but this framework is helpful for 
understanding the Act’s statutory text and structure.”) (emphasis in the original). 
23
 See R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship between the ISP Safe Harbors and the Ordinary Rules of Copyright Liability, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 427 (2009). 
24
 H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). The same exact fragment can be found in the House 
Report (H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 50 (1998)) and in the Senate Report (S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19, 40 (1998)). The only 
difference is that the House and Senate reports still referred to Subsection (k), a provision that was finally renamed as 
Subsection (l).  
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common law, as long as they qualify for the safe harbors. Indeed, the Conference Report, as well as the House 
and Senate Reports, immediately add that “[t]he limitations in subsections (a) through (d) protect qualifying 
service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory infringement.”25 This 
scope is further reiterated specifically with regard to the hosting safe harbor: “New Section 512(c) limits the 
liability of qualifying service providers for claims of direct, vicarious and contributory infringement for storage 
at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider.”26 
 
These passages from the legislative history contradict the idea that the statute intended to exclude from the 
safe harbors’ protection every instance where a defendant may be found secondarily liable at common law. In 
fact, it seems safe to assume that the drafters of the DMCA did not consider the qualifying criteria for the safe 
harbors to be completely coincident with those used at common law to find derivative liability, and thus they 
envisioned that in some situations a defendant secondarily liable at common law would nonetheless benefit from 
the liability limitations.  
 
Moreover, regardless how much both sets of criteria resembled at the time the statute was enacted, it appears 
that the DMCA did not intend to be bound by future developments of the common law standards of secondary 
liability, at least inasmuch these new developments might depart from the criteria laid down in the statute. In this 
respect, the Senate Report indicates that “[r]ather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of these 
doctrines [of contributory and vicarious liability], the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving 
state and, instead, to create a series of ‘safe harbors,’ for certain common activities of service providers. A 
service provider which qualifies for a safe harbor, receives the benefit of limited liability.”27 This may be 
particularly relevant with respect to the Grokster standard of inducement, as it was adopted the Supreme Court 
years after the enactment of the DMCA. 
2.2  The position that inducement liability renders the DMCA inapplicable.    
 
Viacom claims not only that defendants fail to meet the specific requirements for the safe harbors—particularly 
those set forth in subsections 512(c)(1)(A) and (B)—but also that defendants purposefully intended to foster 
copyright infringement, and thus that they are liable under the inducement rule adopted in Grokster. According 
to Viacom, liability for inducement would prevent defendants to take refuge in the DMCA, because “Grokster 
liability inherently defeats the DMCA.”28 
 
In making this claim, Viacom relies on Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung29, where the court stated 
that “inducement liability and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbors are inherently contradictory. 
Inducement liability is based on active bad faith conduct aimed at promoting infringement; the statutory safe 
harbors are based on passive good faith conduct aimed at operating a legitimate internet business. Here, as 
discussed supra, Defendants are liable for inducement. There is no safe harbor for such conduct.”30  
 
Defendants in Fung maintained and operated a number of web sites that allowed users to download files 
located in peer-to-peer networks. Most of the files were infringing—the evidence showed that “90%-95% of the 
material was likely to be copyright infringing”.31 The court found defendants liable as inducers under the 
Grokster standard (“evidence of Defendants’ intent to induce infringement is overwhelming and beyond  
                                                          
25
 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 50 (1998) (emphasis added). See also S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 20, 40 (1998) (same), and .R. 
Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (same). 
26
 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 52 (1998) (emphasis added). See also S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 43 (1998) (same). 
27
 S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998). 
28
 Viacom’s memorandum at 51. 
29
 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578, 2009 WL 6355911, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). 
30
 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *18 (C.D. Cal. 2009). See Viacom’s memorandum at 51. 
31
 Id, at *17. 
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reasonable dispute”).32 Defendants contended they were protected by Section 512(d) of the DMCA, which 
establishes a safe harbor dealing with the provision of hyperlinks and other information location tools.33 The 
court analyzed the safe harbor’s requirements—which are roughly the same than those of the hosting safe 
harbor—and concluded that defendants did not qualify for that protection. In this regard, the ruling held that 
plaintiffs had established that defendants had “reason to know of their users’ infringing activities”, and that 
defendants did not satisfy “their summary judgment burden by identifying facts showing that [they] were ‘not 
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity [wa]s apparent.’”34 It is worth noting that this 
analysis entails a very broad reading of the requirement of § 512(d)(1)(B). In addition, the court noted that 
defendants did “not introduced any evidence that they ‘act[ed] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
[infringing] material’ once they became aware that this infringing activity was apparent.”35 The court held as 
well that defendants failed to meet the statutory conditions because they received a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity and had the right and ability to control such activity. 
 
The Fung court’s statement that inducement liability and the DMCA safe harbors are “inherently 
contradictory” suggests that where inducement is found the safe harbors do not even come into play and thus 
there is no need to assess whether the qualifying conditions are met. However, Fung did not limit itself to 
analyze whether defendants met the Grokster inducement test, but it also evaluated the specific requirements of 
the DMCA—and found that defendants failed to meet them.  
 
But then, if ultimately the ineligibility for the safe harbors rests on the failure to fulfill the DMCA specific 
conditions, Viacom’s contention that “Grokster liability inherently defeats the DMCA” has no practical meaning. 
In any event, the court in Viacom v. YouTube certainly rejected this argument, refusing to conclude that if 
defendants could be found liable under Grokster they would be, because of that, expelled from the DMCA. The 
Viacom ruling said that “Grokster addressed the more general law of contributory liability for copyright 
infringement, and its application to the particular subset of service providers protected by the DMCA is 
strained.”36 The court however did not explain why such an application would be strained. To be sure, the court 
did not see YouTube as an inducer that purposefully promoted, and profited from, copyright infringement. 
Nonetheless, the court avoided evaluating whether defendants actually met the Grokster standard for 
inducement. And while the court suggested that, whatever the result of that test might be, a provider meeting the 
qualifying criteria for the DMCA must be protected from liability, it is clear that the court went ahead on the 
assumption that defendants were not inducers.37  
 
Interestingly, the court appears precisely to infer that defendants are not inducers from the fact that they meet 
the qualifying requirements for the hosting safe harbor.38 However, the prongs of the inducement test do no 
perfectly square with those of the DMCA. As noted above, the Groskster test establishes that “one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or 
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.”39 The Grokster court, moreover, pointed to three elements that allowed finding the intent to induce 
infringement: (a) defendants aimed to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement; (b)  
                                                          
32
 Id, at *11. 
33
 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000). 
34
 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *16. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Viacom v. YouTube, 2010 WL 2532404, at *11 (S.D.N.Y., 2010). 
37
 Ibid. (“The Grokster model does not comport with that of a service provider who furnishes a platform on which its users 
post and access all sorts of materials as they wish, while the provider is unaware of its content, but identifies an agent to 
receive complaints of infringement, and removes identified material when he learns it infringes. To such a provider, the 
DMCA gives a safe harbor, even if otherwise he would be held as a contributory infringer under the general law. In this case, 
it is uncontroverted that when YouTube was given the notices, it removed the material. It is thus protected ‘from liability for 
all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory infringement’ subject to the specific provisions of the DMCA. 
Senate Report at 40, House Report at 50.”) (emphasis added). 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37. 
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defendants did not attempt to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity 
using their software; (c) the commercial sense of defendants’ enterprise turned on high-volume use, which the 
record showed was infringing.40 None of these elements directly involves the requirement of having actual or 
constructive knowledge of specific instances of actual infringements. Therefore, at least in theory, a defendant 
liable under the Grokster test might nonetheless satisfy the lack of knowledge or awareness requirement set forth 
in Section 512(c)(1)(A) of the DMCA if it is construed—like in Viacom—as knowledge of particular instances 
of infringing acts. Thus, while in a case of straightforward inducement, a court would probably find that the 
defendant fails to comply with the qualifying requirements of the DMCA, this might be at the cost of construing 
those requirements in an expansive way. In fact, as noted, the Fung court needed to construe the knowledge 
requirement of the linking safe harbor in a very broad way in order to find that defendants failed to meet it.41  
 
Arguably, the more obvious the inducement is, the more willing a court will be to expand the DMCA 
requirements so that a defendant does not qualify for the safe harbors. To be sure, a real inducer—even if it 
complied with the knowledge/awareness requirement—would be unlikely to satisfy some other conditions of the 
DMCA, such as that of adequately responding to notices of infringement under §512(c)(1)(C), or the threshold 
requirement of having “adopted and reasonably implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who 
are repeat infringers”42  
 
Let’s imagine however a case where a defendant is liable under Grokster but nonetheless formally complies 
with the specific conditions set forth in the DMCA—which does not seem to be an impossible situation. Would 
this defendant be granted the DMCA immunity? Defendants in Viacom v. YouTube would answer this question 
affirmatively. However, the understanding that the DMCA goes so far as to protect deliberate inducers as long as 
they formally respect the safe harbors’ requirements seems problematic.  
 
True, the DMCA intended to provide legal certainty to internet entrepreneurs with regard to their potential 
copyright liability. In this respect, it sought to set forth some clear rules establishing safe harbors from liability, 
even if the situations protected under those harbors might have otherwise given rise to liability, whether direct or 
secondary. As noted above, the legislative history makes this point clear, and so do some particular prongs of the 
eligibility criteria that somewhat depart from common law standards on derivative liability. Actually, it can be 
argued that all this was meant to protect online providers from facing excessive risk in terms of potential 
liability, or to free them from having to invest too much in policing and effectively preventing their users’ 
infringements. It is difficult to accept that the statute would aim to immunize from liability intentional a 
purposeful wrongdoer, i.e., not just an operator of dual purpose technologies or services whose activities may 
bring about high levels of infringement, but an entrepreneur that deliberately encouraged infringement. It seems 
safe to assume that the DMCA did not intend to protect such a defendant.  
 
In any event, however, the facts in Viacom v. YouTube, hardly show defendants to be such intentional 
wrongdoers. There are at least some relevant actions carried out by YouTube that contradict the idea of a 
cynical, bad faith actor. One may consider in this regard YouTube’s compliance with DMCA notices, 
expeditiously taken down the material claimed to be infringing, and moreover preventing the ulterior uploading 
of files identical to those already removed—as well as YouTube’s serious efforts to develop filtering tools or its 
policy against repeat infringers. All these conducts hardly respond to the idea of an intentional inducer, and thus 
seriously undermine plaintiff’s possibilities in the case. On top of that, the Viacom’s motion for summary 
judgment seems to concede that defendant’s business model is not premised on promoting, or profiting from, 
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infringement. Indeed, the motion considers that from May 2008 YouTube is adequately filtering users’ contents, 
and, as a consequence, Viacom limits its claims to YouTube’s activities carried out before that date. All this 
certainly does not comport with a business model that is built on profiting from infringement, and would 
arguably suffice for a court to find that a defendant meets all the necessary DMCA requirements—even if they 
must be construed in a loose way.  
 
A further question worth noting relates to the internal inconsistencies of the statute, which I address in the 
following part. 
3. Construing the DMCA as a mere takedown notice statute. 
As indicated above, Section 512(c) subjects the safe harbor to the condition that the service provider has neither 
“actual knowledge” of infringement, nor awareness “of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent”.43 Upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, the provider must act expeditiously to remove the 
material or disable access to it.44 According to the Viacom ruling, the critical issue presented by the lawsuit was 
precisely “whether the statutory phrases ‘actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on 
the system or network is infringing,’ and ‘facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent’ in § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) mean a general awareness that there are infringements (here, claimed to be widespread 
and common), or rather mean actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of 
individual items.”45 In fact, many other critical issues were raised by plaintiffs. However, the nature of that 
knowledge and particularly the meaning of the awareness prong turned out to be a key point indeed, revealing 
different views regarding the structure of the safe harbors scheme and the balance supposedly achieved by the 
statute. 
 
After quoting extensively the relevant passages of the legislative history, the court—without much 
elaboration—came to the conclusion that “the phrases ‘actual knowledge that the material or an activity’ is 
infringing, and ‘facts or circumstances’ indicating infringing activity, describe knowledge of specific and 
identifiable infringements of particular individual items. Mere knowledge of prevalence of such activity in 
general is not enough.”46 
 
This way of deciding the issue, however, is not entirely unproblematic. To begin with, it certainly does not 
seem to address all the issues raised by the plaintiffs, who did not limit their claims to a defendants’ mere general 
knowledge. What I would like to stress here, however, is that court’s and defendant’s understanding of the red 
flag test raises the question of whether this prong can then be distinguished from the actual knowledge prong at 
all. 
 
It is not that the conclusion of the court is necessarily wrong. Rather it is that some important problems of 
consistency within the DMCA seem to arise. The legislative history explains that the awareness prong “can best 
be described as a ‘red flag’ test. As stated in new subsection (c)(l), a service provider need not monitor its 
service or affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity . . . However, if the service provider becomes 
aware of a ‘red flag’ from which infringing activity is apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no 
action.”47 This way, the awareness prong appears to be meant as a sort of a limit to the provision that establish 
that the provider need not monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity (§ 512(m)). 
The court, however, points precisely to that provision in order to assert that the red flag must mean something 
that in the end is practically indistinguishable from actual knowledge of a specific instance of infringement, this 
way rendering the red flag test inoperative or useless.  
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Court’s and defendant’s reading of the DMCA effectively converts it into a mere takedown notice statute—
exactly what plaintiffs had denounced.48 This appears to run afoul of the purpose of the statute. As noted by the 
House Report, “[t]he Committee emphasizes that new Section 512 does not specifically mandate use of a notice 
and take-down procedure. Instead, a service provider wishing to benefit from the limitation on liability under 
new subsection (c) must ‘take down’ or disable access to infringing material residing on its system or network in 
cases where it has actual knowledge or that the criteria for the ‘red flag’ test are met—even if the copyright 
owner or its agent does not notify it of a claimed infringement.”49 
 
The solution favoured by the court, however, completely places the burden of policing copyright 
infringement on copyright owners. Some other courts have also considered this to be the practical result of the 
DMCA.50 However, this is not the purpose the legislative history tried to convey, as it stressed—as quoted 
above—that Section 512 “preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to 
detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment”.51 
 
Nonetheless, the ambiguous language of the statute, coupled with some specific provision, such as that of § 
512(c)(3)(B) - by which a notification from a copyright owner that fails to comply substantially with the 
elements required by the statute shall not be considered in determining whether a service provider has actual 
knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent - converts the 
purported goal of sharing that burden into a merely rhetorical aim. 
4. Conclusion 
Viacom v. YouTube, now pending before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, tackles crucial issues 
regarding secondary liability of online service providers for copyright infringement. This case is in a way a test 
for the DMCA safe harbors, which were enacted long before the emergence of today’s widespread web 2.0 
services. While it is clear that the safe harbors scheme did not intend to exempt from liability all instances where 
a provider might be found liable at common law, only straightforward bad faith operators seem to fall outside the 
protection granted by the statute. While it supposedly intended to strike an appropriate balance between the 
interests of copyright owners and service providers, the DMCA is turning out to be easier to fulfil than expected 
- in fact almost converted into a mere takedown notice statute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48
 Viacom’s memorandum, at 3. 
49
 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, Part 2, at 54 (1998). 
50
 See Perfect10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007). 
51
 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, Part 2, at 49-50 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 
